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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ACME CRANE RENTAL CO.,
A Partnership,
Plaintiff-Respondent
-vs.IDEAL

CE~1:ENT

COMPANY,

Case No.
9693

UTAH CRANE & RIGGING, INC.
Defendant-Appellant
(And other parties not
pertinent to the appeal)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
ST'A'TEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Utah Crane and Rigging Co.
and Ideal Cement Company, defendants below, against
Acme Crane Rental Co., plaintiff below.
Plaintiff brought an action to collect from defendants the sum of $2,294.51 being the balance claimed to
be due for the rental of a crane used for alterations at
the Ideal Cement plant in February, 1960. During the
work the rented crane of plaintiff broke down. Plaintiff
authorized defendant Utah Crane to make the necessary
repairs, agreeing to pay for same. As a natural consequence of the breakdown, defendant Utah Crane suffered consequential losses including standby for other
equipment, and premium overtime pay to finish the job
on byschedule.
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At the conclusion of the job, defendant Utah Crane
paid plaintiff for such crane rental on a total billing of
$3,342.90 the sum of $1,~048.39 and withheld the sum of
$2,294.51 as an offset to compensate it for the costs of
repair and such other costs as it actually suffered.
Plaintiff Acme Crane sued for the above · offset
amount. Defendant Utah Crane defended on the grounds
of breach of implied warranty, and negligence, ( Tr 12
to 16,69,70) resulting in a decision by the trial court
allowing Utah Crane to offset the costs only of part of
the repairs in the sum of $825.17 giving Utah Crane nothing for its additional and proximate costs flowing directly from the breakdown. Defendants appeal the decision on grounds that the trial court erred in finding an
accord and satisfaction, which the court found wiped
out the breach of warranty; and the court found there
was no duty in plaintiff to inspect its crane before putting it on the job, and that hence there was no negligence.
~E"-q_riginal suit was brought against defendant.~
Jaae ntah Cement Co., but Utah Crane & Rigging intervened and has assumed the responsibility for defense and
any final judgment. (Tr. 68) Utah Crane is the principal
defendant in interest. Defendants claim the court committed error.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant Utah Crane & Rigging Co., hereinafter
referred to as Utah Crane, was employed by defendant
Ideal Cement Co. in early January of 1960, to ma:ke heavy
alterations at its plant at Devil's Slide, Morgan County,
Utah. ·The work consisted of removing a very large 80
ton kiln section from an elevated level, and replacing
same with a new section. The heavy lifts involved the
use of three large cranes simultaneously. 'Ctah Crane
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contacted Acme Crane Rental about two months before
the job was to start, stating it would need a 60 ton crane.
(Tr. 176, 75,)
Lyle Larson, General Manager of Utah Crane, testified:
"I told him that we had contracted for a job
requiring some heavy cranes and asked him if
he had a big crane that we could get to perform
this job ... I told him that it would be necessary
to have two sets of operators because it would
be an around-the-clock operation. The date had
been tentatively set at which I told him the date
and that I would give him as much notice as I
could as to when the permanent dates had been
set and we discussed the rates .... we talked about
replacing a kiln section at Ideal Cement Co. at
Devil's Slide. I am not sure on the first conversation whether we discussed the weight. I think
we discussed the length of the boom that we would
need ... I told him we had to work underneath
some forty foot trusses and we would need a
forty foot boom on his crane, an as I remember,
it was discussed that that was agreeable because
that was the length of the basic boom section of
his crane. (Tr. 176, 177)
For the work, Utah Crane employed one of its own
cranes, and rented the third machine from Bud Jensen
rental company. (Tr. 93, 121, 173)
At the first conversation between Larson and the
Acme representative, Acme had quoted $32.00 per hour.
"Well, that had all been arranged at the first time, the
$32.00 an hour plus the traveling and traveling mileage
and the overtime for the operators." Tr. 76)
There was a second conversation between the same
parties about a week before the machine was delivered
to the job site. (Tr. 76) Larson asked "if it would be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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told me that it would be operated on a 2-1- hour basis ...
and that we should have the operators available to work
that basis ... He said it was a RUSH JOB ... it was
to place a cement kiln up at ~iorgan ... he did state
that he needed a crane that size, in that capacity for the
lift ... " ( Tr. 76)
Utah Crane's Larson testified:
" . . . I again called Paulsen and told him
that the starting date had been definitely firmed
up so that we knew when we would need their
crane ... I asked him if the cables, the operating
cables and the condition of the crane was good,
,and he sa;od yes." (Tr. 177)
Plaintiff admitted in its answer to defendant's counterclaim that "the capacity of the crane" was inquired
into. (Tr.17). The pre-trial order states the parties stipulated that "plaintiff's crane was a 60 ton crane'' and
that they further stipulated "that said crane was lifting
less than its rated capacity.'' (Tr. 27) Acme agreed it
was never abused nor overloaded. ( Tr. 111, 30 :9; 48 :9)
The Acme Crane moved in three days before starting. It is important for this court to know to what extent
Acme understood the nature of the work, the stresses to
which its machine would be exposed, and the responsibility of all parties to the job. The older Paulsen went
to the job site ahead of the commencement. Mr. Match,
Utah Crane's Superintendent testified he showed the
partner around the project, Paulsen asking: "What are
you going to do here~" "Well, come into the building and
I will show you." So him and the other fellow (the operator) we went into the building and I showed him how
we were going to take down this old kiln section and
put up this new one." (Tr. 224) At the conclusion of
the inspection, Paulsen commented to Match : "All he
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said . . . is I had a big job and I had better be careful;
and I assured him that we were going to take every pr~
caution." ( Tr. 225) Larson had also explained in the
earlier negotiations the nature of the job. (T·r. 176) Exhibits 6D and 7D are pictures of the kiln showing its
large size; Exhibit 4D shows two of the cranes in an
actual lift. Exhibit 5D shows the type of equipment leased
by Acme on this job, the red arrows pointing to typical
outrigger boxes that fractured.
THE FRAOTURES
On the second work night Acme's crane began to
break up. (Tr. 110) By 2:00A.M. of Wednesday, February 17 the entire job shut down. It was discovered that
the "out-rigger" boxes were breaking up, fracturing.
These boxes are stabilizers, keeping the crane from tipping, and they are very important to the operation of
the crane. ( Tr. 98, 111) Because defendants theory of
the case is bottomed on breach of implied warranty of
fitness and negligence, it is important to clearly set forth
the evidence of record, as to what was discovered. Acme's
crane operator, Starn, testified that on the second night
at 11:30 P.M.:
1

". . . we hoo~ed on to the end of the vessel
and as we were raising it we heard a popping
sound and we stopped and at the time I thought there are two or three things it could possibly
be. I thought maybe there was a rock under one
of the outrigger floats that had cracked or if a
cable sloughs a little bit it would make the same
sound but we stopped and checked the crane and
found nothing." (Tr. 109, 110)
This operator went off shift within 30 minutes and
the next shift were Hy Peterson and John Valdez as
Acme's
crew.Law Library.
(Tr.Funding
114)
The Acme
operator
and
oiler
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had control of the Acme crane, subject to orders of
Utah Crane's foreman. (Tr. 97, 114:) But if an unsafe
or improvident 1nove is to be made, the crew can refuse
to make the lift. ( Tr. 97, 115) No improper lifts were
made. (Tr. 115) The parties stipulated that at no time
was the crane overloaded. (Tr. 2'7)
The Acme operator's description of the breakdown
was:
"Well, in my taking over the operation of
the crane, Dick said she was all yours, and of
course I assu/me.d that everything was all right
. . . Then as we proceeded in our wm:k, of course
in the picking up of the kiln to bring it inside
of the building there were of course popping
noises . . . we proceed to look around to see if
we would locate anything that might be causing
them, . . . we looked the second time that it was
found by iron workers that underneath the crane
where there was signs that the outrigger boxes
were showing small cracks in them." (Tr. 145,
146) ...

Q. Now did you get under and take a look at the
fracture or break 1
A. No, I took their word for it. It loo:ked like to
me they was pretty honest fellows." (Tr. 152)
Rudy Crowell, the operator of the rented Bud J ensen crane, and not connected with the litigation, testified he was outside the building operating his crane at
the time of the main break at 2 :00 A.::M. ( Tr. 245) The
noise was "loud enough to hear clear outside on the
other end of the kiln, and their crane was inside the
building. I heard it over my crane motor . . . I went
and crawled underneath there because I'm always interested in things like that because I run a crane ... I saw
cracks in the outrigger housing . . . pretty good sized
cracks . . . they was just going all which way in front
and rear." (246)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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EVIDENCE OF PRIOR RUSTED BREAKS
AND KNOWLEDGE THEREOF
The man most responsible for the move, Superintendent Match of Utah Crane, testified that all three
cranes were lifting, moving the new kiln into the building,
". . . And during this attempt we heard a
loud cracking noise ... this was around 2 :00 A.M.
I stopped everything ... climbed on the rig and
talked to the operator. I says 'What has happenedf He says 'I don't know.' I says, 'We'd
better try to find out.' ... This is the first noise
... We went ahead ... we moved the crane forward . . the boom was clear up ... and that time
we really heard a noise. It was no popping. It
was something loud like a cracking noise, like
a shotgun had gone off. So I says, 'we are going
to find out what is wrong ... thats all there is to
it.' So we shut it down, stopped working and
crawled under the crane ... One of my iron workers . . . found there was cracks in the box. I
crawled under the crane and I also saw the cracks.
There was a new crack of ... say, eighteen inches
long, as long as the horizontal top of the outrigger box, and there was also two older cracks at
each end of the outrigger box." (Tr. 227, 228)
Q. Do you remember where the cracks occurred
in the outrigger boxes~
A. Yes . . . I looked at the rear side of the front
outrigger box. On each side of it I found two
cracks that were rusted, a matter of about
six or eight inches; and there was a continuation of these cracks which would be new breaks
going to the top of the outrigger box on both
sides. Then along the horizontal of the outrigger box near the top where the iron was
bent over, there was a horizontal break and
a new one . . . The new breaks were bright
and shiny, and the old breaks were rusted
. . . The cracks were opened up, I'd say beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
provided
by the Institute
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and Library
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you could see on the surface in the cracks
there was RUST. (Tr. 230)
Q. What time was the job shut down, the progress
of the job shut down ... Y
A. I'd say between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning,
Wednesday. ('Tr. 232)
This witness of long experience with machinery
testified the rusted cracks were at least two to threP
weeks old. Tr. 241)
It is undisputed that there was rust in some of the
fractures. Not one of plaintiff Acme Crane's men took
the trouble to look under the crane at the fractures;
however, Acme's operator admitted he was told at the
time there was rust found. (Tr. 123A) Lyle Larson inspected the fractures: "I saw some of the cracks that
had a brown substance on them and around them which
was to me rust which indicated they had been there for
some time." (178, 179) ... "It appeared to be rust that
had been there for some time . . . I would say longer
than two wee:ks." One of the foremen who aided in the
repair, Whitehead, testified he saw the cracks and rust,
and after being qualified to express an opinion as to
the age of the rust, he said: ". . . the rust that I seen
with the experience I had in the past would have had to
have been two to three weeks old." (Tr. 256)
As to whether Acme had knowledge of these prior,
rusted cracks, or should have known, the oiler of Acme,
Dale Schmidt, was heard by four of the crew in the hours
that followed the break to say that the same type of
sounds had been heard before on a former Acme job.
Schmidt was on the shift that quit at midnight Tnesday
and was present when the first cracking or popping
noises were heard about 11 :30 P.M. (Tr. 283, 284) The
next day several of the crew were discussing the break,
and Mr. Match testified:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Q. Did you have any conversation or hear any
conversation that day between any of the
employees or operators of Acme and yourself
or any of your men~
A. Yes, I did . . . it was an hour or two after
the repair of the crane. There was some Ideal
men and myself and the other operators and
oilers of the other two cranes and the oiler
of the Acme crane were standing . . . by his
crane ... we were talking about the damage
to the crane . . . Dale Schmidt . . . he said
they had heard that cracking noise on .a job
before this one and they didn't find out what
it was." (Tr. 236)
Bud Jensen's operator Crowell heard the same admission testifying :
" ... Dale Schmidt ... oiler for Acme's crane
rental . . . We were all standing right there in
a group, and he said he had heard that previous
noise before."
Q. Was there any mention of when or where they
heard the noise~
A. Well, it was, seemed like to me he said it was
on about a thirty ton pickup or a thirty-five
... a lift ... what he said that it was furttn!!J
that outri~gger hou-sing d~dn't break then." (Tr.
247, 248)
The same Acme oiler Dale Schmidt was heard by
Utah Crane's day-shift foreman Whitehead to talk about
such prior noises. The study of the record will show
great effort on the part of Acme to minimize the importance of the rust and the prior noises, but at no time
did Schmidt deny or challenge the prior version of his
remarks by the four witnesses. He said: ''There were
noises on that on previous jobs, yes." (Tr. 283) It all
stands uncontradicted. Here is how Whitehead testified:
"Q. Did you ever hear a conversation between
the
crane
operator
or oiler
of ofAcme
on
the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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one hand and any of your crew or Bud J ensen's crew on the other with respect to what
had happened~
A. Yes . . . on two occasions . . . the first occasion ... it was the morning of the 17th when
we first came on the job ... we started talking about the breaks . . . Dale, their oiler
said they had heard these cracks or heard
the noises ... when was the second occasion Y
... it was after the crane had been repaired
and put back to work . . . the discussion
came up again; and that was mentioned again
... we were all discussing the breakdown, and
Dale said again they'd heard these noises but
could never find the cause ... Roy was asking
Dale where." (Tr. 257, 258)
The witness Burt Match for defendants was called,
and counsel for Acme stipulated this witness would testify the same as Mr. Crowell had, (Tr. 250) which means
that four witnesses heard the oiler for Acme state the
above admissions concerning cracks or popping sounds
that it will later be argued should have put Acme on
notice that its crane was not worthy of rental for such
a large job as at bar.
Please note that the Acme oiler had said as to the
former noises they "could never find the cause." (Tr.
257, line 19 also T·r. 236, line 4) He was also heard to
say "it was funny that outrigger housing didn't break
then." (Tr. 248, line 3)
It must be noted that no careful inspection of the
crane was made by Acme before it came to the Ideal
job, notwithstanding the Acme operator and oiler had
heard the sounds and did not by casual inspection find
what was wrong. Defendant will thus later argue breach
of warranty and negligence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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REPAIR OF ACME CRANE, DAMAGES
Upon the fractures being discovered early Wednesday morning, the General Manager Larson was called
to inspect the cracks, ( Tr. 178) whereupon he went immediately to the phone and informed one of the Acme
partnersByron Paulsen. The trial court concluded that
as a result of this conversation an ''accord and satisfaction'' resulted, hence we feel the need to clearly show
the scope of the conversation by both participants.
Byron Paulsen testified as to what Larson said :
"Well in essence he said that there were
cracks in the outrigger boxes in the metal, and
he wanted to know if they (Utah Crane) should
go ahead and fix it and if they did, if we would
be responsible for the cost of it.
Q. Now by 'the cost of it' what do you mean~
A. Of the repairs . . . Well, I said yes because
I thought it was only prudent to help them
get the work done.
Q. And you gave the authorization~
A. Yes.
On cross examination, the same Byron Paulsen
added:
". . . the phone rang, it was in the dark of
night and finally on its ~ncessant ringing, I got
up and answered it and I didn't really check the
clock ... 4 to 4 :30 A.M. I would not dispute it ...
I have no reason ... that there would be a lawsuit
over it. (Tr. 168) ... Mr. Larson said just simply
that he wanted to get on with the work ... I know
he was concerned about getting to work and proceeding with his job . . .
Q. Well, something rests in your mind that Mr.
Larson said 'we have got to get this repair
job done quick.' Am I right or wrong~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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•·I told him that there was cracks in the outrigger housings of such a nature that we couldn't
proceed with the job . . . I a1n sure that in the
conversation it was brought out that some of them
was old and some of them were new ... l\lr. Paulsen said, 'vVell as you know it is a fairly new
crew (meaning crane). 1 think we should have
P&H or some of Cate's people look at it in the
morning.' I told hi1n that we were under a terrific
penalty up there of $300 an hour shut-down time
on the kiln. We had a definite cornmitbnent to
meet, and I didn't feel that if we were going to
try to meet this deadline and our committment
that we had time to wait for people to come in
. . . He told me that it was his judgment or I
can't remember the exact words, but he gave me
the understanding that we should go ahead and
repair the crane ... " (Tr. 181)

Repair of the .Acme crane connnenced immediately.
It was necessary to locate steel plate on the Ideal Cement
premises. (Tr. 182, 186) .After the repairs had been
authorized by Paulsen and before the steel plate arrived,
it was necessary for Utah Crane's employees to bring
equipment down from the elevated structures of the kiln,
and begin to prepare the out-rigger box surfaces for
repair, and this was done. (Tr. 182, 187) Plaintiff .Acme
contested the time, expense, and personnel required to
repair the crane, so it is important to note the detail
of record.
Utah Crane's Superintendent Match testified:
" ... after Mr. Larson got permission to get
this plate, the plate was brought over and at the
same time the men were getting welding machines,
cutting torches, grinders and chipping guns to
the job. Tr. 232) ... Some of them had to come
from the top of the kiln . . . Actual repair work
began . . . 4 to 4 :30 in the morning . . . I told
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Roundy (foreman) to get all six men on the floor
and to immediately start to repair this crane because it was holding us up. We had to get back
into operation ... There was six men working on
the crane and the Foreman." ( Tr. 234)
All agree the job was shut down for 12 hours during
repair. As a consequence the other cranes and crew were
idled; overtime at double pay was required to finish
the job on schedule. The actual costs of the repair are
stated in Exhibit 2 P in the sum of $665.92 for labor and
$159.25 for materials as billed, making a total of $825.17
and this is the amount the trial court accepted in its
Findings of Fact as an offset. In fact the court could
do nothing else, for Acme had admitted in the Tetter of
its counsel, rejected Exhibit 9D that it would be liable
for that amount. It must be noted that the above figure
does not include any allowance for the cost of the several
welding and cutting machines, grinding and chipping
tools. "The fractures had to be cleaned up, getting the
slag off and veeing the edges down" etc. ( Tr. 187) All
this preparatory work required equipment, none of which
was allowed as to costs.
The other costs of the shut-down were totally ignored by the trial court and eliminated by its findings
of an accord and satisfaction. These additional direct
elements of damage are stated in Exhibit 2 P and include $638.35 as the cost of the Sunday premium time
and $830.99 as the cost of the standby of the two other
cranes for 12 hours, for nothing else could be done during the repair. (Tr. 192, 208) It is the combination of
these two items above in the sum of $1519.34 that constitute the subject of this appeal.
The balance of the facts will be stated in connecSponsored
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
AND CONCLUDE THAT ACME SHOULD BE NON-SUITED
AS A MATT'ER OF LAW.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING NO DUTY WAS
PROVEN, HENCE NO NEGLIGENCE.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS AGREED UPON,
THEREBY DISCHARGING THE CLAIM OF BREACH OF
WARRANTY.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OFF-SET JUDGMENTTODEFENDANTFORFULLDAMAGESBYREASON
OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AND NEGLIGENCE.

ARGUl\iENT
POINT I
THE T'RIL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AND
CONCLUDE THAT ACME SHOULD BE NON-SUITED AS
A MATTER OF LAW.

A search of this record will clearly disclose that
under no circumstances could it be said that appellant
Utah Crane was culpable, negligent or under any delict.
Utah hired the services and equipment of a regular renting company with years of experience of a 60-ton crane
with operators, Acme representing the crane to be in
good condition. (Tr. 177) The Lifts made were all
stipulated to be under the rated capacity of Acme's crane
( Tr. 27) and at no time did Utah Crane abuse the crane
by admission of Acme's operators. (Tr. 49 Int 16)
The machine broke down under a lift of about 40
tons, this being but two-thirds of its rated and represented capacity. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
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LOSSES SUFFERED BY UTAH CRANE in respect
to standby time for two idled machines, crew, and Sunday double time¥
Questions of Burden of Proof, presumptions, inferences are brought into focus by this court in WYATT
v. BAUGHMAN, 239 P2d 193 involving the respective
rights, duties and obligations of bailor and bailee. This
court should bring to bear in the case at bar its own
standard of who was responsible. This court exhonerated the hanger-bailee in the airplane fire case when
the bailee showed its own absence of fault, tending to
prove due care by the bailee. In the Wyatt case this
court said : '' There was no suggestion made by plaintiff
(bailors of the planes) either by way of evidence or
argument, of a source from which negligence might arise,
upon which the defendant (bailee) did not present some
competent evidence tending to negative his negligence."
To the contrary in the case at bar: not only does the
record show positively that the bailee Utah Crane committed no fault, but the following affirmatively shows
some fault on Acme as bailor:
a. It affirmed the crane was in good condition.
(That the crane failed under no abuse, and at
but two-thirds of its capacity, and this under
the hands and moving control of Acme's operators.
b. Notwithstanding the usual groans and noises of
cranes generally in heavy lifts, the oiler of Acme
admitted that at a former lift of about 35 tons
at another location, it was "funny that outrigger
housing didn't break then." (Tr. 248) It is not
"funny" at all. It was tragic that he was so careto not
find
out what
wrong,
orandreport
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his inability Tr. 98) so that 1nanagement could
take the important danger into hand with such
inspections as might be required.
c. Acme by its Inanagement and its crew did not
make inspections at any time of the instrwnents
by which the crane gets its stability in heavy lifts.
(Tr. 98, 96, 95, Int. 19 Tr. 31 & 49,) They took
it for granted everything was all right, because
they had never had any trouble before with the
boxes. ( Tr. 93) They too:k great comfort from
the testimony of Match that he did not carefully
examine out-rigger boxes; but it was not relevant to Acme's case as to what Match did in
the absence of such noises as the Acme oiler
had heard. Had Match heard such unusual noises,
he would have been on notice too.
d. Rust on old fractures on the boxes, extending
from the new breaks, had been on the machine
for a long enough time to import to any court
that the cracks were there when the crane came
to the Ideal job. The rust and cracks were patent
defects. But even if they were "latent", the
standard of care required of the law stated by
the court in RENOLDS v. AMERICAN FOUNDRY, 239 P2 209 required inspection, and this
court holds the bailor who fails to inspect before
use of a chain or machine of a dangerous potential use, to be liable for the damages occasioned
by the failure. So does the Restement of Torts,
No. 392; So does Learned Hand in SHAMROCK
v. FICHTER STEEL. 155 F2d 69; So do Justices Crane and Cardoze in HOISTING ENGIXI~
SALES v. HART, 142 NE 342.
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e. Acrne made no exhonerating explanation as to
why its crane failed, but the failure it admits in
answer to interrogatory 7. (Tr. 48, interrogatory
29, 32, 34, 36, 38 Tr. 49 to 51) Acme did say in
its answers to interrogatories that it "assumes
that the defects in the outrigger boxes were there
at the time of the manufacture of the crane." ( T·r.
50, no. 38) In interrogatory 18 (Tr. 31) as to
the cause of the fracture, Acme simply said :
"Plaintiff presumes that the cause of the
fracturing of the outrigger boxes was defective
steel in the boxes." (Tr. 49 No. 18)
Thus Acme not only failed to even try to exculpate
itself as a matter of fact in the record, hut as a matter
of law, it also failed. It did not do what the Utah court
has required of it as even a minimum in the "simple tool"
doctrine of PETERSON v. ALKEMA, 261 P2d 175, let
alone in REYNOLDS v. AMERICAN FOUNDRY, supra. And if the Utah court's decision in WYATT v.
BAUGHMAN, 239 P2d 193 puts any burden of proof,
or raises any presumptions against a bailor, after the
bailee has clearly established that it was without fault,
then as a matter of Utah law, Acme as bailor has failed
to rebut a clear presumption of negligence, prudence,
duty, and due care that by all the cases on implied warranty subject it to. The trial court failed to see the real
questions of law to be applied to facts that were never
really in dispute. Respondent Acme failed utterly to
prove that appellant Utah Crane owed it anything! The
plaintiff-respondent should have been non-suited. This
court should render such a judgment, for respondent
proved nothing!
It is clear in the record that there is no dispute of
anyby therelevant,
No
witness
Acme
disSponsored
S.J. Quinney Law material
Library. Funding forfact.
digitization
provided
by the Instituteof
of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

puted a material fact stated by Utah Crane. Acme undertook to shake defendant's witnesses on cross examination only, but Ae1ne was in a position to bring forward
·witnesses who might have neutralized or changed the
testimony of Utah, but Acme did not do this. Hence we
can say that no material fact was disputed.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING NO DUTY WAS
PROVEN, HENCE NO NEGLIGENCE.

Defendant pleaded in its counterclaim the two
defenses of negligence and breach of implied warranty,
(Tr. 15, 70) and the case was tried on both theories. At
the trial there were attempts made to preclude defendant
from claiming breach of warranty. The court took that
question under advisement, and its conclusions rested
the case on both theories. The court held that defendant
proved no duty on the part of plaintiff in respect to the
condition of the outrigger boxes and consequently found
no negligence. In this the court clearly erred.
It was clearly negligent for plaintiff to bail the
60 ton Acme-crew-operated crane for heavy dangerous
lifts without making an inspection. It admitted repeatedly it did not take any such precautions. ( Tr. 95, 96,
107, 113, 147, 165, Int. 19, pages 31 and 49 of T'r.)
Yet it knew as much as 80 ton lifts were to be made
between the three cranes concurrently. Had any one of
the cranes failed during a critical lift, many men could
have been killed, and tremendously expensive equipment
at the Ideal plant could have been demolished. The worst
did not happen because of the prudence of Utah's Match
who was sensitive to the evidences and sounds of weakness. (Tr. 227)
The evidence of Acme's duty is replete in the record,
(Tr. 96, 106, 107, 133, 135, 145, 150, 165, 167) but even
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if it were not proven as a fact, it clearly exists as a
matter of law, and so has since ancient times. The excellent old case of Flttnt & Walling v. Beckett, 1960, 79 NE
503 discusses the duty arising out of contract :
''If a defendant may be held liable for the
neglect of a duty imposed on him, independently
of any contract, by operation of law, a fortiori
ought he to be liable where he has come under
an obligation to use care as the result of an undertaking founded on a consideration. Where the
duty has its roots in contract, the undertaking to
observe due care may be implied from the relationship, and should it be the fact that a breach
of the agreement also constitutes such a failure
to exercise care as amounts to a tort, the plaintiff
may elect, as the common law authorities have
it, to sue in case or in assumpsit.... 'One who
enters on the doing of anything attended with
risk to the persons or property of others is held
answerable for the use of a certain measure of
caution to guard against that risk. To name one
of the commonest applications, 'those who go
personally or bring property where they know
that they or it may come into collision with the
persons or property of others have by law a duty
cast upon them to use reasonable care and skill
to avoid such collision.' In some cases this ground
of liability may coexist with a liability on contract toward the same person and arising ( as
regards the breach) out of the same facts . . . .
'In every situation where a man undertakes to
act or to pursue a particular course he is under
an implied legal obligation or duty to act with
reasonable care, to the end that the person or
property of others may not be injured by any
force which he sets in operation or by any agent
for which he is responsible. If he fails to exercise
the degree of caution which the law requires in
a particular situation, he is held liable for any
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bound hin1self by an obligatory promise to exercise the required degree of care .... If there had
been any remedial necessity for so declaring, it
could obviously have been said without violence
to principle that 1nen who undertake to act are
subject to a fictitious or implied promise to act
with due care."
In this interesting old but currently eitP<l emw, there
is also treated the possible tardy claim of plaintiff that
defendant was contributorily negligent. Defendant was
under no obligation to make inspection of the Acme GO
ton crane, the latter being under the control and maintenance of Acme operators exclusively. (Tr. 11+ :23A,
97)
The above Flint case was cited by the 7th Circuit
recently in Shuttleworth v. Crown Can, 165 F2d 974 in
the following:
"True, the lease entered into by the parties
provided that defendant should not be liable for
any damage to plaintiff's property that might be
caused by the use of, or by reason of any defects
in the machine, nevertheless, it owed plaintiff the
duty of exercising due care in furnishing the
machine'' then citing said case. (Lease of Canning
machine)
The unimportance of bailor's negligence in a balement case is well pointed up in the more recent decision
by Learned Hand in Shamrock Towing v. Fichter Steel,
155 F2 69 where a crane collapsed, underloaded as to
its capacity, damaging a boat and the cargo. The liability
was fully imposed on the bailor on the well established
doctrine of breach of implied warranty, not negligence.
In reading this case, let it be remembered that Acme
supplied a 60 ton-rated crane that at the time of fracture
was lifting but 40 ton, and that at a 35 ton lift at another
location prior, there had been heard dangerous cracking
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sounds not reported to management by the crew nor
investigated. We believe defendant well proved a negligence case, but primary proof and law aims at breach
of warranty, clearly established here by principles in
the Shamrock case supra.
The same effect are two Utah cases:
Peterson v. Alkema, 261 P2 175, 1953
Reynolds v. American Founday, 239 P2 209, 1952
Finally: when one of the partners looked over the
job ahead of starting, remembering his warning to Utah's
superintendent. (Tr. 225) So deeply was the court impressed with the presence of this testimony that he shut
off defendant for further establishing knowledge of the
job and its risks that it said: ''Paulsen Sr. was on the
job. He looked it over and said, 'It's a dangerous job;
be careful.'" (Tr. 2-1:9) The court later forgot any standard of care, duty, on plaintiff. But in every particular,
defendant's Match was careful. It was plaintiff that had
not been, and was not !
The trial court's conclusion there was no duty was
"clearly erroneous" and must be reversed.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS AGREED UPON,
THEREBY DISCHARGING THE CLAIM OF BREACH OF
WARRANTY.

Conclusion of Law number 2 says:
''The plaintiff and defendant ... entered into
a new agreement on February 17, 1960, when the
Utah Crane stopped the use of the said crane
because of the discovery of cracks in the outrigger boxes, and under said new agreement the
parties agreed that plaintiff would pay for actual
costs of repair.... That the making of the new
agreement resulted im .an accord and satisfaction
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existing claims against each other including the
claiin of breach of warranty.... " (Tr. 56)
There is no basis in the record to substantiate the
above conclusion. It is "clearly erroneous.'' The idea
of an accord and satisfaction was never pleaded by the
plaintiff as required by Rule S.c and it was lll'\'Pr suggested by plaintiff at the trial. It is the fig1nent of
i1nagination of the trial court. It is the wrong way
out. The real vice in the above conclusion is that it is
aimed at taking from Utah Crane the $1,569.34 of damages it actually suffered because of its costs and expenses
while the repair was going on and immediately after.
There is no basis in fact for such a conclusion. We will
show that the law requires fair evidence of intent by
l~ tah Crane for such a waiver of rights to be employed
against it. It is a matter of contract, express or implied
in law. There are neither.
To approach this question, there must be established
first an implied warranty of fitness of the Acme crane,
and in the face of such a warranty, the breach thereof,
plus the waiver by Utah Crane of a claim for ~meh
breach. There was clearly an implied warranty; there
was the breach thereof, and there was no waiver.
1.
T·HERE WAS AN IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF FITNESS
When the General J\,Ianager of Utah Crane negotiated for the crane far ahead of need, he specifically
asked Acme the condition of the machine and was told
it was in good operating condition. (Tr. 177) This was
an express warranty. Plaintiff at the trial never disputed this express warranty and in fact affirmed it:
"It was in good condition ... we hadn't had any trouble
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with it." ( Tr. 93) Under the evidence, it is clear that
Acme mis-represented it under doctrines of knowledge
imputedand respondeat superior.
There is not the slightest question in the record
but that the crane broke down. There is much evidence
to show that it was not in a good, operable condition
when it came to the job. But on the question of breach
of warranty its prior condition is not important. Shamrock Towing v. Fitchter Steel, 155 F2 69. In Eastern
Motor Express v. M aschmeljer, 247 F2d 826, the 2nd
Circuit being affirmed by a refusal of the U. S. Supreme
Court to grant certiorari, post, it is clearly laid down
as the rule that ''the duty of the defendant, as bailorwarrantor is .absolute."
One of the leading cases on the subject is Hoisting
Engine Bales v. Hart, 237 NY 30, 142 NE 342, annotated
in 31 ALR 536. This strong court unanimously accepted
the able opinion of Judge Crane. There the plaintiff
leased a traveling crane to defendant for use in digging
and laying pipe.
1

"Mter the defendant had installed the traveler and hoist, it broke down completely and failed
to do the work for which it was hired. Defendant
had a subcontract ... in New Jersey to excavate
a trench and lay 10 miles of water pipe. The
pipes were of steel, 30 ft. long and 72 in. in
diameter and weighed about 4~ tons each. With
the derrick defendant intended to operate an
orange-p€el bucket to do the digging and also
intended to use the same machine to put the
pipe in the trench. The hoist could not be operated as it was designed to work, and the boom
broke when attempting to lift one of the pipes.
That the machinery was unfit for the purpose for
which it was hired has been determined by the
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by the appellate division concludes us from examining the question. . . .''
In the case at bar, there can be no question that
the court has found the 1nachine broke down and was
not fit for its use, because the trial court awarded the
immediate costs of labor and part of the materials used
in repair. Plaintiff admitted the machine broke down
and needed the repair, and it specifically authorized
Utah Crane to repair it, and go on with the job. (Tr.
48, Nos. 8 and 10) Under no theory we can see is this
appeallate court precluded from review of the question
of warranty, the breach thereof, and the damages resultant. Further in the Hoisting case, supra:
"The defendant having returned the traveler
and hoist, this action was commenced to recover
the rental reserved in the lease. The defendant
counterclaimed by setting up a breach of warranty
and demanding the damages sustained in consequence thereof. From a judgment recovered by
the defendant (the person in a like position to
Utah Crane here) the plaintiff has appealed, presenting what it claims to have been errors in the
admission of evidence to vary the terms of the
writing as given above."
The application of the law to the case at bar does
not involve questions of admissability; but in the discussion, the New York court lays down the law of warranty in bailments, clearly pertinent to the case before
this court.
"This case was not tried on the theory of an
express warranty so let us proceed to consider
the implied warranty, if any. If there be an implied warranty in the hiring of the machinery for
a special purpose, that it is and will be fit for
such use, or at least, will work, then the warranty
may be proved or implied even though the hiring
was by written agreement, containing no war-
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ranty. 'All implied warranties, therefore, from
their nature, may attach to a written as well as
an unwritten contract of sale. (case) There is
an implied warranty in manufactured goods sold
by the maker that they are free from any latent
defect growing out of the process ... (cases) That
the sale of any of these things was in writing,
expressing no warranty, would not prevent the
warranty by implication from attaching. By analogy there is an 1-mplied warranty in the hir1-ng or
bailment of certain kinds of property. In the hiring of a horse there is an implied warranty that
he is fit for the purpose for which he is taken .. .
in hiring a carriage that it will not fall apart .. .
(cases) Shipowners agreeing to furnish the necessary cranes, chains and gearing to a stevedore
to discharge a cargo impliedly warrant that the
chains are so far sound as to be sufficient for
the work intended . . . cases . . . When a stable
keeper let a horse, knowing that it was to be
used to take a family to a funeral, he was liable
for an injury caused by the unsuitableness of
the horse for the purpose for which it was
hired....
"In Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 1 No.
1117 we find this : 'The owner of a chattel which
he lets out for hire is under obligation to asertain
that the chattel so let out by him is reasonably fit
and suitable for the purpose for which it is expressly let out, or for which, from its character,
he must be aware it is intended to be used; his
delivery of it to the hirer amounts to an IMPLIED WARRANT THA'T ·THE CHAT'TEL IS,
IN FACT, AS FIT AND SUIT'ABLE FOR
TH.AT PURPOSE AS REASONABLE CARE
AND SKILL CAN MAKE I'T.'
"'This is the rule to be applied to the facts
of this case. The plaintiff owned a traveler with
a hoist for digging and lifting work. It hired it to
the defendant to do such work on his contract
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warranty that the thing would work as it was
supposed to do. Instead of this, it broke down,
came apart, and collapsed with the first heavy
load. The -defendant does not claim that there
was a warranty that this machine would do a
special class of work for which it might or might
not be adapted; he claims on the usual and customary warranty implied in all such hiring that
the machine will work, will go, will do the thing
for which it was built, the class of work which
its nature indicates it was intended to perform .... Judgment affirmed." (in favor of the
defendant-bailee)
The annotation following the above case at 31 ALR
540 shows that it in:riunciates a well settled doctrine, and
should be applied to the facts of the case at bar. The
annotation is brought down to date in 68 ALR 2d 854.
An important element of the case· and doctrine
rests on the reasonable knowledge of the bailor of the
intended use by the bailee. The !ecord is cle~r that Larson advised Acme at the original contract, two months
before the delivery, of the nature of the use ·to which
the crane would be put oil the job; (Tr. 176, 177) an<I
one of the partners was actually shown at the plant
what was to be done three days before commencement.
After looking it over, the Acme partner said it was a
big job, and to be careful. (Tr. 225) The court was so
aware of this knowledge that he cut off a witness's
testimony as cumulative (Tr. 249) and Acme never disputed the point. The doctrine of the New York case fits
like an excellent glove over an important hand!
2
THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY
The New York court quotes the old Halsbury Laws
of England to the effect that "The owner of a chattel
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which he lets out for hire is under obligation to ascertain
that the chattel so let out is reasonably fit and suitabl~ .
. . ." In the case at bar, Acme let the crane out for
hire for a particular use at the profitable rate of $32.00
per hour, 24 hours per day; and for the week's work,
it billed Utah Crane $3,342.90, none of which defendant
contested; it preserved only it's right of offset for its
losses incident to the unworthiness of the machine let!
Was the Acme crane "reasonably fit and suitable"
when it entered the job~ It is clear that it was not I
The trial cour wholly ignored in its findings the entire
subject of the old, rusted, pre-existing cracks. The subject of the rusted fractures is pertinent to defendant's
theory of breach of warranty as well as to negligence,
under the widely established and followed breach of
warranty doctrine. No where did Acme claim there
was no rust. Their own people paid no attention to the
fractures, old or new. (Tr. 100, 107 ,113, 147, 150, 152,
153) Match described the rust he found with detail.
( Tr. 230, 2·40, 241) One of the defendant's repairing
foremen, Whitehead had to grin~ and chip out the rust
from the fractures in order to close them with metal
and weld the new plates over the breaks. (Tr. 253, 254,
258) The operator of Acme's crane, charged with the
responsibility for its condition and care, admitted he
did not get under and look at the breaks, having no
curiosity. He simply said: "No, I felt they (Utah Crane)
knew what they were talking about, and if they said
there were cracks there and breaks there, the thing
was then to get it fixed." (Tr. 153)
This same. careless operator had . taken control of
the crane 30 minutes or less after the first popping or
cracking
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145) No warning was passed to him by the two Acme
men going off, and he testified, '• I assumed that everything was all right.'' There wPre the first sotmds of
his shift; they "proceeded to look around to ~PP if we
could locate anything that 1night be causing them," the
sounds ..... we never found any the first time. We
looked the second time that it was found by iron workers
(employees of Utah Crane) that underneath the crane
where there was signs that the outrigger boxes were
showing small cracks in them." (Tr. 146) The Utah
superintendent described one crack alone as being 18
inches long! From the moment of the complete breakdown back for many days or weeks, this lack of interest
in the crane is clearly evident. Please note that when
Bud Crane operator heard the noise, he climbed under
the Acme rig and looked, for, as he said, "I'm always
interested in things like that because I run a crane."
(Tr. 246) Here as elsewhere is evidence of duty the court
said had not been shown !

DUTY
Let us examine the record to see the duties and
powers of the Acme crane operator and oiler, and then
measure their performance: The partner P. H. Paulsen
with whom the first arrangements of bailment were
made and who represented the crane to be in good
operating condition, said of the oiler and operator of
his crane as to whether they would know more about
the condition of the outrigger boxes : ''Sure they would
because they are operating it all the time ... of course
when they are actually operating on the job, why they're
supposed to be reasonably sure it is in a good operatmg
condition . . . they have really got the control . . . of
course they have . . . .
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"Q. And if in the course of the operation of that
crane the operator and the oiler come to
knowledge that their unit is defective, they
should report that to you?
A. That is what they do .... They report it to
one of us.
Q. And had your operatives during the period
we are talking about, ever brought to your
attention that the crane had any defects there
in the nature of breaks in the outrigger
boxes?
A. No.
Q. And you made no casual nor careful inspection of the outrigger boxes before they went
to this job, did you?
A. I didn't no . . .
Q. Are the outrigger boxes important to a big
lift?
A. Yes ... highly important." (T·r. 97, 98)
Whereas the trial court erroneously found "There
was no proof of a duty to make an inspection of outrigger
boxes" and coneluded "That plaintiff was not negligent"
(Tr. 55) the ·well established law holds that the duty is
always present, that the basic idea back of implied warranty is a duty to bail a fit machine. In Price Bo-iler v.
Go·ridon, 138 F. Supp. 43 the bailor rented a 25 ton
crane to lift a smoke stack during which work the
crane failed. The bailor "did not take over the operating of the crane and if he had it stiJll would have
been the .duty of defendant's crane operator Besemer
knowing that his crane would not lift the 12% ton
stack, a least with a 100 feet boom, to have advised plaintiff's agent. Besemer could not .sit idly by and watch
the bailee operate his crane in a manner that he knew
to be negligent or to have his machinery attempt something that he knew or should have known it could not
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fatal to life or property.... We agree, that there was
an implied warranty here." The court cites excellent
authorative cases, including Learned Hand's opinion in
Shamrock Towmg v. Fichter Steel, 155 F2d 69. The
Utah trial court committed reversable error in ignoring
the impact of breach of warranty here.
Appellant ask this court to refer back to the statement of facts, herein at pages 8, 9 and 10 and examine
carefully the admissions of the Acme oiler Dale Schmidt
wherein he never denied his statement to the crew that
similar noises as happended in connection with the fractures that had been heard before. Yet he failed to report
this to his superiors. Respondeat superior! The knowledge of Dale Schmidt is imputed to the Paulsen partners.
His failure to look hard enough to find the old fractures
when they were casually looking before, and at least
to report to his employer the dangerous sounds he
admitted to four witnesses he had heard on another
job or jobs, is not even required in a breach of warranty
by a bailor, and in a negligence approach is more than
enough to pin the full responsibility on plaintiff.
The Utah Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Henroid holds as the law of Utah that an inspection
must be made. In Reynolds v. Amer.ican Fo'UIIUlry &
Macht"ne, 239 P2d 209, 121 U. 130, defendant acquired a chain for use in lifting, failing to test or
inspect; and in a lift of less than the rated capacity
of the chain, it broke, injuring the plaintiff worker.
This court made quickly away with the claim that there
was no duty to inspect! Defendant contracted with
Silver to make repairs on a transformer, wherein the
said chain was to be used by Silver in hoisting:
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''·The record ma:kes it clear that defendant
supplied Silver with the chain purchased for the
hoisting of the core, for use by plaintiff and
others in accomplishing a ·business purpose of
the defendant, that of effecting emergency repairs
to its plant.
"In such event, the authorities uniformily
call for a higher standard of oare from a supplier
of chattels than is required of one who furnishes
the chattels gratuitously arid not for his own
business purposes. The supplier is required to
.~mploy reasonable care in discovering any dan-_
g·erous character or condition. thereof. The rule
is ·more ably stated in the Torts Restatement and
is illustrated in the Comment and examples thereunder. It is .·accepted by many authorities, and
we sub.scribe to such doctrine. . . . We believe
that the jury wa·s justified in. resolving the facts,
including FAILURE TO INSPECT OR TEST
the chain. -. .. " · · ·
This court-'s citatio:n and adoption of the rules in
RESTATEl\fENT OF_ TORTS, (sections 391 and 392)
is .determjn~tive of this case. Acme had a business interest, and earned $3,342.90 subject to the offset incident
tq .the failure of the . crane. Knowledge .of the defect,
rust and the antecedent cause theretofDre known to the
oiler Schmidt must be. imputed to .Acme. ·Note- the rule
at page 1066 of vol. 2, Restatement ·o£. T·o-rts :
"A person so supplying goods is required
not only to give warning of dangers which he
knows are involved in the use of the article, or
which, from facts within 4is knowledge, he knows
are likely to be so involved, but also to subject
the article to such an INSPECTION as the
danger of using it in a defective condition makes
· it reasonable to· require of him. The additional
DUTY OF INSPECTION thrown upon the person so supplying chattels for a use in which he
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duty of inspection imposed upon one who permits
another to come upon his land for his business
purpose and the absence of such duty where the
permission is granted for any other reason.''
It was reversable error for the trial court to find
''there was no proof of a duty to make an inspection .... "
(Tr. 55) and particularly when there was good reason
to know that something had gone wrong on former jobs.
When Acme supplied a 60-ton-rated-crane and it failed
under a 40 ton lift, there is a clear breach of implied
warranty. When its oiler had heard such sounds on
a former 35 ton lift .as to cause him to say later that
"it was funny the outrigger housing didn't break then''
(Tr. 248) it is clearly a breach of warranty with notice;
it is culpable negligence. It could have been a crime
had someone been killed!
This court will also be interested in consistency in
the disposition of the case at bar with Petersen v. Alkema, 261 P2d 175, -------- U -------- where the transient
fruit picker was injured by the falling ladder. This
court held:
"Under the simple tool doctrince as recognized in this jurisdiction, the employer retains
the duty to supply safe appliances for use in his
regular business."
Certainly this court cannot ignore the like duty of
a bailor, in the rental for a high return of a dangerous
tool like a 120,000 pound-lifting crane! Under the smalltool doctrine, this court held that the employee is
"chargeable equally to the employer with knowledge of
all obvious or readily discoverable defects," and the
former noises in the outrigger and the intervening rust,
must be found by this court to constitute a woeful
breach of duty-warranty or negligence. The trial court
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"dodged" the standard of high care laid down by this
court in the Reynolds chain case supra, employing the
dubious conclusion that Utah Crane had waived and
compromised its rights to claim the rule. Let this court
support and dignify its chain rule with excellent facts
and the total absence of waiver, hereinafter argued.
See PROOF OF F AC'l,S, Lecture Series, S.L.Co.
Bar & Utah College of Law, '"Proof of Dangerous Condition, Allen & Romney, Jan. 18, 1961 for pertinent
treatice.
THE HYPOrrHETICAL QUESTIONS
Two hypothetical questions were put and answered
in the record :
1. The very operator of the crane at the breakdown,
Peterson, testified he heard the fracturing noise that
nia tch and Crowell had said was like a shot gun, ( Tr.
:2:27, :2-+5) yet he said there was no difference between
this and the ''usual popping noises in connection with
the operating of the crane." (Tr. 1-:1-7) He still testified
on direct that "Then as we proceeded in our work, of
course in the picking up of the kiln to bring it inside
of the building there were of cmtrse popping noises ...
and we proceeded to look around to see if we could
locate anything that might be causing them ... we never
found any the first time. \Ve looked the second time ...
there was signs that the outrigger boxes were showing
small cracks.... " Tr. 145, 146) On direct this witness
further described the casual nature of his inspections
thus:
"Q. Will you tell the court what inspection you
routinely make on the crane as you go from
one job to another~
A.
Well,
it is what one can actually see with
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usually, as far as my crane is concerned,
get down and get under everything and take
a lie detector so to spea:k or any kind of a
n1achine and detect whether there are any
cracks or not in any part of the metal.
Q. Do you usually inspect the outrigger boxes Y
A. No" (Tr. 14-7)
Now this same witness was asked on cross examination
the following question, and may it be kept in 1nind that
when the cracks were found, some of them clearly were
rusted:
"Q. I want you to assume that they are cracked,
and an inspection of the outrigger boxes
would have revealed that they were cracked.
ould you in ordinary prudence as an operator of this equipment have taken that equipment onto this jobT
A. Well, I certainly wouldn't have and if I had
just informed those that I am working for,
they wouldn't have allowed it to have gone
onto the job either.
Q. Now there wasn't even a casual inspection
of the outrigger boxes by you as to the boxes
at any time connected with the Ideal Cement
job until after the fractures, is that righU
A. That's right." (Tr. 150)
How escape the standard of care set by Acme's own
operative, and the entire management was constructively
on notice something might be wrong from the oiler who
made the undenied admission he had heard the same
type of noises before and told no one. Utah Crane
should not be caught in such a trap; Acme should not be
exhonerated from such culpability.
2. Acme called Andrews an expert witness who was
president of his crane rental firm, with 16 years' experience with like machines as broke down. (Tr. 130) At
the time of shop servicing this expert said on direct:

'V
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"When they are brought into the yard, shop, why they
are usually brought in on the floor of the shop and
greased with a pressure lubricating machine and gone
over quite thoroughly, but out on the job ... it is the
oiler's job to watch and check a machine to see that Vt
is im working order, that there is no loose bolts and get
under it and grease it and inspect drive lines, etc. . . .
We visually look the machine over and the operator
usually is aware if anything is going wrong or needs
attention. The man that is operating it would be the
closest contact with it to know. The management would
not go out on the machine himself everytime a machine
goes out of yard and thoroughly inspects it, no. . . .
The ordinary day-to-day maintenance is performed by
the operating crew. . . . If the outriggers are extended
and they are blocked at this time, the pressure would go
on the outriggers. . .." ( Tr. 131 to 135) The end of the
expert's testimony on direct was that he had never had
an outrigger box fail.
The above direct examination compelled the defendant to put a hypothetical question to the expert, the
answer to which turned the entire weight of his testimony
to the standard of legal care required by the Utah court
in Reynolds v. American Fo11,ndry, supra and in Hoist~ng Engine: Sales v. Hart, supra. The trial court committed fatal error in failing to give any weight to the
expert testimony. He ignored it! Keeping in mind the
New York case-law that the bailor has the "obligation to
ascertain that the chattel so let is reasonably fit and
suitable" and of Utah to inspect, and also that the
operatives of Acme had heard similar noises before,
and the existence of the old rust, now note the questions
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··Q. If you had a 1nachine wherein the oiler or
the operator had heard unusual popping
noises, would you t")xpect hiin to make a more
careful inspection of the vehicle than if he
had not heard such loud popping noises¥
A. Yes . . . loud popping noises aren't a real
co1nmon occurance .... I would want to know
where it came from.
Q. And would you expect your operator and
oiler to bring to your attention what had
happened?
A. Yes."
And after considerable struggle, defendant's counsel was
allowed to put the hypothetical question and get the
answer:
"Q. Assume l\fr. Andrews that )'OU are the owner
of a crane and you are asked to put the crane
onto a job, like the Ideal Cement plant, to
make a lift with two other vehicles of about
an 80 ton kiln section and you are asked the
question at the time you agree to send the
crane to the job as to the condition of the
equipment, and you understand that it is
in good condition and you state to the lessee
that the crane is in good condition and also
assume that you have not made an inspection
of the outrigger boxes, and the machine goes
to the job and in the course of a lift some
loud popping noises are heard and the job
is stopped and your operators and riggers
looked around for a few moments and find
nothing and then later on, within an hour
or two or three, the loud popping noises
happen again, and a careful inspection reveals that the outrigger boxes are fractured
with some fractures being as long as 20 inches
and that in connection with several of these
fractures there appears old rust, and further
take into account that your oiler says 'Well,
we have heard those noises before on about
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a 40 ton lift at the Utah Oil Refining Co.,
and I am sure glad that these outrigger boxes
didn't fracture down there.
"Now I want you, assuming those facts,
to state whether in your opinion and experience that crane is worthy of your allowing
it to go onto a job of the character that I
have described 1" (Tr. 140)
The expert said he had an opinion and the court allowed
him to say:
"A. Well, I believe the oiler and operator should
have reported any undue, unusual noises to
management when they were heard, anytime
they were heard and an inspection made to
find out possibly what was causing them. Any
crane has a lot of grunts and groans and
cracks and pops when you are working them,
but if you are referring to something extraordinary, unusual pop and crack, why I would
be of the opinion it would have been thoroughly ~nvestigate;d to see what was causing it."
(Tr. 141)
Acme's operator Starn testified on direct that it
was not the practice to make a detailed inspection of
the outrigger boxes. . . . "I don't know of anyone that
does. It's ass1trned that the outrigger boxes are substantial to take what they were designed for, and we
don't make an inspection of them." (Tr. 113) The oiler
who heard the noises on the former occasion, and said,
"It was funny that the outrigger housing didn't break
then" (Tr. 248) was on notice something was wrong,
but like the operator, he "assumed" that everything was
all right. By the standard of Acrne's expert witness,
and the law laid down in the strong cases cited in this
brief, the bailor's obligation is clearly breached. The
warranty of fitness must be applied. It is clear error for
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trial court found a poor way out by fabricating an accord
and satisfaction having the legal consequence of wiping
a..way the right of Utah Crane to recover its damages.
There is no evidence upon which such a legal conclusion
could have been arrived at.
Southern Iron & Equip. v. Smith, 165 SW 804,
264 Mo. 226
Flint & Walling v. Beckett, 79 NE 503, Ind.
Shamrock Towing v. Fichter Steel, 155 F2d 69,
2 CCA
Eastern Motor Express v. Maschmeijer, 247 F2d
826, 65 ALR 2d 765, ( Cert. denied by US Sup.
Ct., 355 US 959, 2 L ed 2d 534)
The trial court committed reversable error in finding no duty was proven, as is evident from the immediately above cited Eastern 1\fotor case: The bailor
had delivered barrels of caustic material to bailee for
transportation during which movement the containers
leaked creating damage. In suit by the bailee-carrier for
recovery of the damages the 2nd Circuit said:
"Under the common law, a bailor impliedly
warrants that the goods are fit for the use for
which the bailment is made at least against latent
unfitness .... Thus a shipper in delivering goods
for shipment impliedly warrants that the containers, if not patently inadequate, are fit for
the contemplated shipment. . . . In this case the
undisputed facts imperatively required a finding
that the defendant had breached an implied warranty existing under the common law as recognized by the Packing Rule. As a defense to the
plaintiff's claim of breached warranty, the degree
of care exercised by the defendant is irrelevant,
for, with exceptions not pertinent here, the DUTY
OF THE DEFENDANT AS BAILOR-WARRANTOR IS ABSOLUTE."
Please note that the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari, supra, and by so doing, established
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as the law of the case at bar an ABSOLUTE LIABILITY. The Utah court should retain its rule of the
Reynolds case, and articulate it clearly here joining
with the great authorities of the nation.
The effect of the trial court's findings is to enlarge the liability of Utah Crane, requiring it to assume
all of the standby costs of the two other cranes, crews,
and the premium Sunday overtime, all of which was
occasioned by the breach of warranty of the 60 ton crane
of Acme. The 2nd Circuit said this should never be
done to the bailee except under express or fairly implied
agreement, the latter being clearly absent this record!
Mu,lvaney v. K'lng Pa'lnt, 256 F. 612 cited in the Eastern Motor Express case supra.
The Idaho court recognizes the doctrines of implied
warranty here claimed to be dtpposite:
Thompson Lumber v. Cozier Container Corp. 333
p 2d 1004
Anticipating that Acme-respondant may urge that
Utah-appellant selected the specific crane, and must be
charged with taking the specific machine in its then
poor condition, the record will not support such a claim.
At pages 176, 177 Larson said: ''I told him that we had
contracted for a job requiring some heavy cranes and
asked him if he had a big crane that we could get to
perform this job." Acme's partner testified ... "he did
state that he needed a crane that size, in that capacity
for the lift that he had up there." (Tr. 76) " ... the only
machine he asked about was the sixty ton machine. He
said he had to have that size crane for that lift up there.
(Tr. 78) The machine was never in the "possession" of
Utah Crane but was under the operative conrol of Acme's
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only by Utah. (Tr. 97) Larson testified he expressly
asked Paulsen if the crane was in good eondition in
connection with the expressed in tended use and was
told it was. (Tr. 93, 177) Paulsen could not remember
whether such a question was asked, but he said at the
trial: "It was in good condition." (Tr. 93) If Acme
shall herein undertake to come under any rule that
defendant selected the specific crane (which we dispute,
and the above will disprove), then under well known
doctrines, the express warranty of Acme that the machine
was in good condition negates any responsibility for
such selection. I-Iad Paulsen said the crane was not
in good condition, it is unthinkable that Larson would
have taken jt notwithstanding. Larson relied on the
representation. Caveat emptor will never be employed
in the face of such specific inquiry of fitness, undisputed.
Builder's Brick v. Walsh Transp. 174 NYS 690
3
THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Acme had committed a breach of implied warranty
in sending a crane to the job that was defective, not
fit for the known, intended service. It also well knew
that the job for the cement company was on rush, an
"around the clock, twenty-four hours" employment.
Whether it knew there was a potential penalty attached
for failure to complete the schedule is disputed by Acme;
but be that as it may, when the crane had broken down,
it was apparent to the litigants that repair must be
accomplished at once. In the telephone call between
Larson and Paulsen, no conditions were stated except
that if Larson fixed the crane Acme would pay ''the
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cost of it" ... meaning "of the repairs." (Tr. 165, this
being the version of Acme.)
The only other testimony concerning this conversation is from Larson, who testified:
"l\Ir. Paulsen said, 'Well, as you know, it is a fairly
new crane. (Record says crew, but this is incorrect) I
think we should have P. and H. or some of Cate's people
look at it in the n1orning.' I told him that we were
under a terrific penalty up there of $300.00 an hour
shut-down time on the kiln. We had a definite commitment to meet, and I didn't feel that if we were going
to try to meet this deadline and our commitment, that
we had time to wait for people to come in.

"Q. What did he tell you to do~
A. He told me that it was his judgment or I
can't remember the exact words, but he gave
me the understanding that we should go
ahead and repair the crane."
Q. And did you do that~
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 181, 182)
Counsel for Acme suggested no theory of an accord
and satisfaction at the cmnmencement of the. trial when
in his opening statement he informed the court:
" ... The crane was stopped for temporary repairs
from 4:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on February 17. Acme
authorized the temporary repairs to be paid to keep
the job going, but the costs of these repairs is one of
the issues framed in the pre-trial order." (Tr. 73) It is
clear the idea of ''accord and satisfaction" came into
the mind of the trial court after the record was closed.
Please note the report of the superintendent March
attached to Exhibit 3D it being a letter to the general
manager of defendant Utah Crane, which said letter
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interrogatories to plaintiff, was admitted in evidence at
the trial (Tr. 82) The contents of the letter as touching
upon the phone conversation states :
"I notified 1ny superior immediately and he
in turn notified Acme Crane Co. He received
permission from them to do anything we had to
do in order to put the crane back in a safe working condition. . . . " (Fourth paragraph)
The accuracy of this statement was submitted to
plaintiff in defendant's interrogatory number 50, (Tr.
34) wherein plaintiff was asked respecting said letter
to "Please examine the same and state whether the
srune is an accurate statement of what happened at the
time of the breakdown. If plaintiff does not agree with
said statement, please give particulars as to wherein
the srune is not accurate."
Byron Paulsen, the same person for plaintiff who
had the phone conversation with Larson, verified the
answers to said interrogatories, and he stated in answer
No. 50:
"50. The facts set forth in the statement of
Mr. Match are substantially correct as far as
plaintiff knows ; Plaintiff was not informed as
to the arrangement between defendant-intervenor
and Ideal Cement, that is, to the tight schedule
and was not advised as to the possibility of excessive back charges for time lost." (Tr. 51)
Counsel for defendant propounded the followint
question 51 to Acme defendant:
''Intervenor contends that about 4 :00 a.m.
on February 17, 1960, its manager Lyle Larson
telephoned a partner of plaintiff at Salt Lake
City from the job site, and explained the breakdown, and that plaintiff's crane operator was
present at said call. Intervenor further contends
that the partner of plaintiff so talked with, told
Lyle Larson : "Go ahead and make the repairs.
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You are on the job and know what needs to be
done. We will pay for the costs and delay.'' If
said contention is not true, please state what was
said by the plaintiff-partner in connection with
authorizing said repairs." ( Tr. 34, 35)
The sa1ne Byron Paulsen for plaintiff answered the
above as follows:
"51. Mr. Byron Paulson admits that he
authorized the repairs and when asked if they
would pay the costs for the repair of the crane
only Mr. Paulsen admitted that they would probably have to, and authorized the temporary repairs. Mr. Paulsen did not agree, at that time
nor since, to pay for the costs and delay. Authorization was limited strictly to the actual costs
of reasonable temporary repairs." (Tr. 51)
Note the frequency of the word "authorize." The
way this testimony all con1es in from all parties negates
any waiver. It is largely the language of authorize,
permission, ''we should go ahead and make the repairs,"
and as lastly said above, Acme "would probably have to"
pay the costs only. None of the parties to the litigation
ever thought of, or suggested any condition, waiver or
an accord. It is the fiction of the trial court only, as a
conclusion, in which there is not the slightest foundation
in the evidence for support.
We cmne now to the application of the law of Accord
and Satsfaction to the above facts. George Hudson v.
Yonkers FruVt Co., 258 NY 168, 179 NE 373 is well annotated in 80 ALR 1052 wherein the New York court, Justice
Cardozo writing, gives an excellent treatice on ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION. In the case at bar we are dealing with an unliqu~dated claim; and it must further be
noted that Acme had agreed to deliver a crane in good
condition (Tr. 177) and that the machine had broken
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repair. rtah Crane was under no obligation to repair.
Acme by phone told Utah's Larson to fix the machine
and Acme would "pay the eo~t of it'' (Tr. 165). The
Cardozo opinion says :
Two forms of accord and 8ati~:d'aet ion of unliquidated clai1ns are to be discovered in the
books. One is where there is a tru(' a.ss('ut to
the acceptance of a pay1nent in cmnpro1nise of
a dispute, or in extinguishment of a liability,
uncertain in amount. (authorities stated) The
other is where the tender of the payment has been
coupled with a condition whereby the use of
the money will be wrongful if the condition is
ignored. . . . What is said is overridden by
what is done, and assent is imputed as an inference of law. (authorities quoted)
The trial court in the case at bar got to his theory
of accord and satisfaction by unlawfully imputing it
as a conclusion of law only. We believe there is no basis
in the testimony warranting such imputation. Plaintiff
did not plead accord as required by the Utah Rules,
and the case was not tried on that theory.
Justice Cardozo said in the Hudson case supra that
between those litigants "there had been no dispute between the parties and there was no assent by the creditor.... '' As testified at the trial, there was no dispute
between Larson and Paulsen. Judge Cardozo goes on
''There was not even any compromise." In the case at
bar, there is not the slightest inference of compromise.
Note the learned New York decision on this point:
"A compromise may result where something
is abated from a demand which exists, if it exits
at all, for a liquidated sum. A compromise may
result where a demand, previously unliquidated,
is fixed at a given figure, for the right is thus
surrendered to make the figure higher. None of
these elements of detriment is present in the case
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at hand. The defendant did not abate a dollar
from a liquidated claim. It did not surrender
the opportunity to add to the amount of an unliquidated claim. The conclusion is inescapable
that there was no genuine assent to an accord and
satisfaction, and that the debt was not discharged
unless the situation is one in which the law
IMPUTES assent, irrespective of the state of
mind accompanying the receipt."
In the telephone conversation of record, taken from
either version, Larson (Tr. 181) or Byron Paulsen (Tr.
165) nothing was abated. Paulsen testified with no apparent abatement matters in anyone's mind, and he expressly said "I thought it was only prudent to help them
get the work done ... and gave the authorization." Had
the parties truly had a discussion by phone concerning
the full damage possibilities on the breakdown, and
then Paulsen made an offer which Larson accepted, there
might be imputed or found an express accord. But the
parties were not talking the language of compromise,
and that Larson would be authorized to fix the crane for
the costs was wholly reasonable under the circumstances
of that sleepy moment. It was not the responsibility of
Larson to repair the crane. It must be regarded as a
courtesy by Larson to Paulsen to do the repair now and
thus minimize great potential damage by down-time that
might be imposed by Ideal Cement. Acme suffered no
detriment. It did less than the law would have required
it to do at that time. It was Utah Crane that suffered
the detriment. Acme was under an implied warranty
in leasing the fully operated machine to keep it operating, and it should have made the repair or immediately
supplied another crane. It had no facilities. Acme suggested delay to the next day in order to bring in the
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gestion the latter finns would do repair. It was prudent
for Larson to state the down time penalty Ideal CPHH'nt
had uttered and to urge im1nediate repairs of which Utah
Crane were prepare to nmke and Acn1e was not. \Vhat
did plaintiff give as consideration for such a benefit!
It gave up nothing but its pruent n1itigative permission
to allow the quick repair, and received much benefit by
having Utah Crane do the repair. It being obligated to
do the job, and too distant to quickly accomplish the
same, it simply said Hfix it, we will pay the costs", nothing more.
Are there not two contract situations in this matter
that must be isolated fro1n each other, and which the
trial judge has mistakenly merged Y
1. There was the initial contract for the entire job:
Acme agreed to supply a crane in good condition, at a
fixed rate, fully operated with additional overtime pay,
and to do so on a "rush", round the clock operation. This
engagement was clearly bilateral, for Larson had to
know he could have the machine in order to contract with
Ideal Cement. In law there is implied warranty covering
the job.

2. Within the initial contract performance, the break
occurs, and it becomes necessary and prudent for someone to make the. repairs. Is there not an -independent
unilateral contract now formed, midway along in the
main contract, a promise by Acme to pay for the repairs
if such are made by Utah Crane7 Did an isolated contract for repairs merge with the total contract, wiping
out any duties or rights in respect to the warranted
crane, or could the main contract exist through the breakdown, with the inside, incidental independent unilateral
contract for repairs being isolated?
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We believe the unilateral repair engagement did not
reach to any modification of the larger bilateral contract
which embraced the warranty of fitness. The trial court
seemed to obfuscate the two contracts into an accord
and satisfaction. Under the doctrines of HUDSON v.
YONKERS, supra, the evidence does not allow such a
merger and wiping out of existing contract rights to Utah
Crane relating to recovery of damages. There was no
compromise of damages. There was simply the ~tate
ment by Paulsen that he would pay the cost of fixing,
and by the offset at the trial, the court made him assume
those bare costs. How can such a unilateral agreement
reach further to wipe out the consequential damages over
and above actual costs of repair~ There was no ''genuine
assent" to any such accord and satisfaction, as required
in HUDSON v. YONKERS. To impute a larger scope
to the interior independent repair agreement does violence to defendant. Can it be said that Utah Crane approved any abatement or waiver of its right to recover
full damages incident to the breakdown~ Did Acme exact
a condition of Utah Crane that if Acme would pay for
the actual repair costs it would be relieved from the additional damages incident to the break~ The answer in
the testimony is no! In HUDSON v. YONKERS, the
isolation of the inside contract is made more plain in
the following quote: "What was paid had no connection
with what was disputed and reserved". We would paraphrase What was agreed to as to repairs had no connection with what was presently not discussed, was in
law reserved, and was later disputed in the billing period,
(Ex. 1, 2) and is the real subject of the litigation and
the appeal. Acme has always admitted they must pay
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the offset deductions for the proximate damages that
flowed directly from the down-time of those repairs,
discussed herein later.
The trial judge "constructed, or i1nputed" an a::-~sent
leading hin1 to the conclusion of law that there was an
accord. N" ote the following by Cardozo in tlw H l T DHO N
case:
"The doctrine of accord and satisfaction by
force of an assent that is merely constructive or
imputed assumes as its foundation stone the existence of a condition lawfully imposed.
Acme was under obligation to 1nake the repairs. It did
not impose any condition or waiver on Utah (~ran e.
Please note the nature of the cross examination of
Acme's Paulsen as to the intent in mind of Paulsen in
the phone call: he could not remember that Larson men·
tioned the $300.00 per hour penalty that Ideal might
impose; and he said: " ... I do not remember any part
of the conversation like that. If I had have, I would have
driven that crane right off the project if I had thought
he was going to try and put a penalty on to me." ( Tr.
170) This proves the limited, isolated, independent nature of the discussion. Paulsen further showed he understood the language of compromise, dispute, accord, pen·
alties, wherein he followed the above by saying: ''If he
(Larson) had said that, I would have immediately I have been in the construction business a long time and
I would have immediately known what he was getting
to." (Tr. 170, line 22)
The question of accord is utterly disposed of, found
not-existent, in the following final quote from the RUD·
SON v. YONKERS case:
"The difficulty remains that nothing in the
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ing check amounts to the imposition of a condition that the check must be rejected if any item
of the account is thereafter to be questioned by
the creditor. All that the account does is to enumerate the debits and the credits among which are
items of commission, and strike a balance. The
creditor is not informed that the deductions
claimed by the debtor, the accounting agent, will
be deemed to be finally approved by the acceptance of the check. He is not informed that the
tender is in settlement of a dispute, for none
had yet arisen. He is informed of nothing more
than the readiness of his debtor to account to
him for money admittedly his own, without the
suggestion of a purpose to foreclose controversy
as to the deductions if any are disputed. An
accord and satisfaction is not so easily established. (cases) The debtor must make it clear that
it is taken in full payment." (Emphasis added)
Paulsen did not inform Larson that any rights were
being waived by Utah Crane repairing the crane. Larson
was not informed that a dispute as to ultimate damage
was being settled by the authorization to repair. As in
the HUDSON case, "a dispute had not yet arisen". The
strongest form of the testimony is out of Paulsen himself, the party in whose behalf the trial court creates
the fiction of the accord, and Paulsen gave the court not
the slightest basis for such inferences. On appeal the inferences must be in favor of the appellant, and this would
require the taking of the Paulsen testimony at fac:e value,
absent any condition that would reach a waiver of important rights and duties never discussed, and not in
the mind of the man who said he was familiar with such
problems.
The effect of the trial court engrafting an accord
where none was pleaded, asked for, thought of, nor
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v. KING PAINT, 256 F 612 at 615, the
Second Circuit said:
''In determining the scope of the terms of the
agreeinent, contracts of baihnent should not be
enlarged beyond their plain meaning to impose
further liability upon the bailee."
It is unthinkable for the trial court: to have heard
Acme represent it would n1ake available a crane in good
condition for a large, heavy job it understood; fail to
find the crane was unfit through no fault of Utah Crane;
hear the bailor ad1nit time without number that no inspection was made nor needed; hear that a prior fracture had been present either frmn the time of manufacture, or from a prior job when cracking sounds were
heard sufficient that one of Acme's operatives wondered
why the outriggers hadn't fractured then, but he couldn't
find what was wrong, and didn't bother to report it to
his superior; rust was present in old cracks from which
new fractures continued the breaks when the only explanation of the rust by Acme was that it could have
occurred "overnight"; listen to two hypothetical questions put to Acme's own witnesses that clearly showed
culpability; listen to the unshaken evidence of the costs
of the idled two other cranes and crews, and the necessity for Sunday double-time costs due to 12 hours time
loss during repair in the middle of the job, and deprive
the blameless bailee of its legitimate damages resulting
from the breach on the muddled, unproven, unasked nonexistent and illegal conclusion that the whole thing had
been compromised in an accord and satisfaction! What
we are saying is that the conclusion is without merit,
foundation, and is "clearly erroneous", by the standard
for reversal required historically in this court and in
SHAMROCK TOWING v. FICHTER STEEL by Judge
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Hand, supra.
There was no accord and satisfaction in fact, nor in
law. When such error is erased from the case, as this
court should accomplish, there remains clear proof in the
record of a breach of irnplied warranty of fitness, and
the only problem left is to properly assess the damages,
and allow Utah Crane the total off-set. When this is
done, plaintiff Acme will take nothing, with costs to defendant!
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OFFSET JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT FOR FULL DAMAGES BY REASON
OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AND NEGLIGENCE.

In the excellent crane-failure case of HOISTING
ENGINE SALES v. HART, 237 NY 30, 142 NE 342, 31
ALR 536, earlier discussed on another question, it is
clear that the bailee of the unworthy crane not only
avoided the suit for the rentals, but recovered the damages sustained "in consequence thereof."
The Uniform Sales Act, 60-5-7 ( 6) sets the measure:
"6. The measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
breach of warranty.''
The defendant, upon being billed for the job by
Acme Exhibit 1P), returned to Acme Exhibit 2P prepared by its accountant. The offset of its out-of-pocket
damages in the sum of $2,294.51 was held back, and defendant remitted $1,048.39 as the difference. (Tr. 264,
267, 187) The trial court allowed defendant all of its
12 hour costs for the rigging crew for repair and the
materials stated at the bottom of Exhibit 2P but denied
defendant the two items of $638.35 for Premium Costs
for Sunday Work and $830.99 as the cost of the two idled
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STAND-BY COSTS FOR TWO CRANES AND CREW
The billing of Acme, Exhibit lP on page ~ thereof
deducts 12 hours from its charges .. while crane was out
for repairs." The trial court honored the clailn of dt>fendant for $665.92 shown on Exhibit 2P which covered
the same 12 hours of down tin1e. If there 'va8 a breach
of implied or express warranty, the "loss directly and
naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events"
as stated in the Sales Act supra must also include the
standby time for the two cranes that were idled by the
fracture, and the costs of the oiler and operator shown
on Exhibit 2P. ·These men and machines were away from
home. The machines could be used for no other purpose
at the time, and were not. (Tr. 192, 193) Defendant paid
Bud Jensen the rental. ( Tr. 193) The rate of pay for
the Bud Jensen crane was $27.50 per hour but the billing for some reason was understated at $25.00 per hour.
( Tr. 193) For the two idle cranes the total costs and
damages are the billed amount of $600 which should be
disallowed plaintiff and credited to defendant as an
offset.
The two oilers for each of the idle cranes were paid
the sum of $102.33 as shown in the offset bill, Exhibit
2P. The two operators for the idle cranes were actually
paid the sum of $128.66 ( Tr. 194) The Bud Jensen operator expressly testified he was paid. ( Tr. 248)
These cost-damages figures totaling $830.99 are
firmly planted in the record. Acme's counsel did not
cross examine nor contest them. They are direct, natural
and proximate losses resulting in the ordinary course
of the breakdown, and defendant is entitled to offset
this sum on the record made below. There is not the
slightest evidence they were waived in an accord or other
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satisfaction. This court should award judgment offset for
said $830.99.
On page 2 of Exhibit 2P, being plaintiff's own billing to Utah Crane, it deducted its own costs for ''Time
from 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. Feb. 17, 1960 while crane was
out for repairs ... in the sum of $410.29". If it cost
Acme $410.29 for the twelve hours, rightfully subtracted
from its bill, why in justice make Utah pay for the same
12 hours it had to pay the crane crews and idle two
cranes~ Acme offered no reason for the court not to
offset!
PREMIUM COSTS FOR SUNDAY WORK
Exhibit 2P shows defendant refused to pay Acme
the sum of $638.35, and offset said amount because of
its added costs for Sunday work that were directly made
necessary by reason of the 12 hour shut down during repair. This item was heavily treated during the trial.
Whether or not defendant is entitled to it as such offset
is a matter of law, not of fact. There is no question about
the facts: the record clearly shows the 12 hour shut down,
all admit.
Utah's general manager fully justified the offset
by the following:
"We lost a twelve-hour straight time shift out
of the middle of this job; and the result was that
on the end of the job we had to work a twelvehour overtime shift to compensate for the one
we lost." (Tr. 195, 202)
It is clear in the record that but for the shut down
the work would have been completed by one shift on
Sunday, but in order to turn the kiln back to Ideal Cement
for its brick-work (Tr. 246) on ~londay morning, it was
necessary to work the crew at double time for a second
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time. It si1nply asked for credit of one-half of its actual
second shift cost in the sum of $638.35 which was denied
as an offset. The trial court conunitted error in finding
this cost was waived in an accord. At the ti1ne Larson
and Paulsen talked about repair, this cost could not have
been known or anticipated, hence it could not in all reason and candor been in the minds for compromise. It
was not waived. It was never compromised.
At the trial, its incursion was strongly cross-examined only. It was misunderstood by the trial court even
to the last. But its justification and allowance as a direct
damage cannot be overlooked nor denied as a matter of
law. No evidence was offered that it should not be allowed.
In elaboration of the record to justify the offset,
we give the following: The men on the Sunday shifts
were paid double time by defendant. These costs are
governed by agreement of necessity with the union. (T:r.
266) Acme admitted this at page 92 of the record. Acme
was asked only to assume straight time for the second
shift. (Tr. 196) Larson testified: "On the shift that we
lost, we would have had to have paid straight time. We
were penalized in the amount of this double time or twice
the amount of money that the men normally receive."
('Tr. 196)
The job was scheduled with Ideal Cement to turn
the kiln back to them on Monday morning at 7 :00. (Tr.
215, 216, 222) Except for the Wednesday 12 hour delay
in the outrigger box failure, there were no other factors
that delayed the schedule, Larson testified in effect. (Tr.
211) By working the second Sunday shift at double
cost, defendant was able to return the kiln to Ideal Cement at the scheduled time of 7 :00 A.M. ~Ionday morn-
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ing. Tr. 217) Had the second shitt not worked on Sunday
the job could not have been completed. (Tr. 247) Everyone would then have been involved in much greater damages against Ideal Cement at the rate of $300.00 per
hour. ( Tr. 181, 182)
Had the schedule not been met, and Ideal brought
an action for $300.00 per hour for excessive down time,
this court would be dealing with problems met in SHAMROCK TOWING v. FICHTER STEEL, supra, and there
is little doubt it truly would have cost Acme "a lot of
money". Defendant mitigated its damages for which it
should be rewarded, not penalize as the trial court erroneously did, and for which it should be reversed.
The trial court at the end of the Larson testimony
was not clear on why Sunday overtime had been offset,
and it interrogated the witness again to clarify. Here is
the answer, and we submit it is logical, and represents
a direct, natural, and proximate damage suffered by
Utah by reason of the fracture:
"If we hadn't had to stop, a twelve-hour shift
on Wednesday, we would have been far enough
along with the critical part of our work so that
we would have been through with the critical
portion of it sometime during the day shift on
Sunday. We wouldn't have been required to go
in and pull out our temporary bracing, shoring,
and so on, on an overtime basis after we had the
kiln aljgned and welded so it could have been
bricked...." (Tr. 219)
Q. And had you not been twelve hours on Wednesday night you would have had the job
done twelve hours earlier on the Sunday
shift~

A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 219) "The shift we are billing
for is the night shift. We are only billing
for one shift on Sunday.... We would have
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They were not going to work on Sunday night, but this
was Inade necessary by the breakdown. The co~t~ of this
extra premium shift were actually paid, and should be
borne one-half as the direct, proxin1ate costs of the breakdown. (Tr. 196) There is no other way to virw the damage. Utah Crane was wholly reasonable even though counsel for Acme and the court had difficulty to understand
what the witness was compelled to offset. This court \vill
have no difficulty in a study of the record of the Sunday
premium time offset, and it should certainly be allowed
as a matter of law as a proper deduction against plaintiff. When this is done by this court, plaintiff will take
nothing!
CONCLUSION
This case should be disposed of by this court reversing the trial court, and entering a decision that plaintiff
failed to prove its case; that defendant's offsets were
warranted as a matter of law on the record, and defendant will appreciate the vindication of its rights, and of
the expensive, time-consuming costs involved in the repair, the trial, and of this appeal.
Respectfully,
WARWICK C. LAl\iOREAUX
Attorney for Appellant
415 South 2nd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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